Hamid Kabiri shahabad; Mohammad Issaei Tafreshi
Abstract
Information inequality of the parties to the contract is known as an asymmetric information phenomenon. This causes two other phenomena called adverse selection and moral hazard that are seen in the banking loans market more effectively. In this paper, the role of collateral against this phenomenon has ...
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Information inequality of the parties to the contract is known as an asymmetric information phenomenon. This causes two other phenomena called adverse selection and moral hazard that are seen in the banking loans market more effectively. In this paper, the role of collateral against this phenomenon has been examined by considering the economic importance of movable property and the need to use these assets for collateralization and attraction of credit. In addition, the requirement of movable collaterals for playing this role has come to light. This article argues that the use of collateral will efficiently handle adverse selection and moral hazard phenomena within the Iranian banking loans market, especially with respect to the weakness of the tools necessary for tackling with this issue and will also prevent from accumulation of dues. However, the lack of information transparency and confidence in the security rights within movable property weakens the function of this type of collateral and reduces its potential for collateralization. The creation of a public register system of security rights in movable property as the most effective tool for ensuring transparency and confidence in movable
